In this paper we aim to understand how unemployment bene ts may a ect investment in education when the latter is characterized by uncertain returns. This is done in an overlapping generations model in which endogenous growth is introduced through human capital accumulation. We develop a numerical example of the model in order to reproduce some key di erences between the European versus the North American economy; di erences that, according to this model, result from the di erent degree of social protection characterizing both economies.
Introduction
There has been an extensive debate on to what extent large systems of social protection do or do not a ect economic development See Jonas Agell and Ohlsson 1997 for a survey. The European and the North American welfare states typically constitute two di erent representative models of social protection systems adopted in developed countries. The former being characterized by large social spending contrasts with the latter, much more reduced and incentive-based. The comparative analysis between these two models has therefore been an important tool in the context of this academic debate. On one hand, distortion of incentives caused by and rigidities resulting from these systems have been pointed out as a source of economic growth slowdowns See Lindbeck et. al. 1993 , Lindbeck et. al. 1994 and Dr eze and Malinvaud 1994 and as e ciency decreasing See Dellas 1997. Health, educational spending, social protection measures which reduces income inequality on the other hand, may be considered productivity and hence growth enhancing Atkinson 1995 and Persson and Tabellini 1994. Part of this debate has focused on the role and the nancing of education. Education is a long run investment project whose risky nature is widely accepted and incorporated in the literature on human capital See Levhari and Weiss 1974 , Williams 1979 , Snow and Warren 1990 . The risk factor results from the uncertainty c haracterizing the returns to educational investment, and hence future labor earnings. This uncertainty is often likely to induce lower levels of educational investment See Levhari and Weiss 1974 , Williams 1979 , Snow and Warren 1990 . The relevance of this phenomenon becomes obvious as soon as one accepts the role of human capital and hence of education in economic development.
In this paper we consider a model in which human capital accumulation through educational investment generates endogenous growth. Education is assumed to beindividually nanced in an incomplete credit market: in order to produce human capital in his rst life's period, an agent contracts a debt which h e will have to repay in his second life's period. Returns to educational investment are characterized by uncertainty, leading to investment levels which are lower than in the absence of such uncertainty see Rillaers and Dur an 1998 . We study whether the introduction of unemployment bene ts may encourage investment in education and hence stimulate long run growth, as they would reduce the uncertainty of future income. We assume that the government introduces an unemployment bene ts scheme nanced by taxes, by which agents will be ensured a minimum income: some percentage of average labor income, -the replacement ratio-, will be considered as a poverty threshold which will also constitute the unemployment bene t the government w ants to guarantee. Agents whose labor earnings are below this threshold, will choose not to work and to join the public protection program receiving the unemployment bene t. Those whose labor earnings are above this threshold will choose to supply their e ective labor. The introduction of these unemployment bene ts will therefore cause unemployment.
The discussion will be carried out in an overlapping generations model building on previous work by Michel 1993 and Rillaers and Dur an 1998 . It is shown that the introduction of an unemployment bene t has two opposite e ects on individual educational investment; on the one hand it is likely to reduce incentives to invest in education, as it guarantees a minimum income independent of individual e ort and productivity; on the other hand, if relaxing the borrowing limit, an unemployment bene t may allow for higher levels of indebtedness and thus of educational investment, which will be taken advantage of whenever the borrowing constraint i s s e v ere. Whether the aggregate e ect on educational investment will be positive or negative depends on which of the two e ects dominates. Hence, the results obtained do not unambiguously point in favor of unemployment bene ts, at least if economic growth is our only concern.
The presence of unemployment bene ts has however other consequences like reducing income inequality, which may be indirectly growth enhancing. According to Persson and Tabellini 1994 income inequality reduces economic growth, as it promotes distributive struggles, discouraging growthpromoting activities. Alesina and Rodrik 1991 too argue that a less equal distribution of wealth leads to a lower rate of economic growth, due to the resulting majority v oting on tax rates. Our model is not de ned to study these e ects of income inequality on growth; however, in the second part of this paper we will examine the implications of reduced wage inequality in terms of welfare. To do so we develop a numerical example of the model, which also aims to reproduce European and North American statistics. In general, we i n vestigate whether the introduction of an unemployment insurance system helps the model to better reproduce European data while the case without such a social protection system re ects more the North American economy. More particularly, we analyze whether the presence of unemployment bene ts provides a possible explanation for the di erences between the European and the North American economy in terms of unemployment rate, labor productivity, education level and income inequality.
The paper is organized as follows: the rst section describes the model, and analyzes and discusses the behavior of this economy. In section 2 we develop a numerical example of the model such as to reproduce some stylized facts which characterize the economies of Europe and of the United States. Section 3 contains the concluding remarks.
The model
We essentially build on previous work by Michel 1993 and more particularly on a model by Rillaers and Dur an 1998 ; an overlapping generations model in which h uman capital accumulation accounts for endogenous growth, and in which the returns to education are uncertain. We extend this model introducing unemployment bene ts in order to analyze their impact on educational spending, and hence on long run growth.
The household's behavior
In each period t a new generation consisting of N t individuals is born. The numberof individuals of each generation grows at a constant rate n; so we have that N t = 1 + nN t,1 . Consequently the total population also grows at the rate n. The model is a three-period overlapping generations model. In the rst period the agents do not work, neither consume, but decide how much to spend on their education e t . This amount is borrowed on the capital market. The individual human capital accumulation rule is given by h t = z t H 1, t,1 e t 1 where H t,1 is the existing average stock of human capital. z t represents an individually speci ed ability shock. It is assumed that each individual is endowed with a di erent ability to take advantage of his educational investment in terms of human capital formation. This ability is assumed to be not observable ex ante, and to be only revealed once the agent has decided upon his educational investment. As a consequence a same level of education will not necessarily provide each individual with a same level of human capital 2 . The distribution of the shock h o wever, is assumed to be known to the agents; in particular we will assume a uniform distribution, z t U a; b with a 0. The density function is therefore constant, fz t = b , a ,1 , and we know that a = , p 3 , and b = + p 3 where and are the mean and the standard deviation of the distribution respectively. 2 0; 1 measures the relative weight of individual investment in the human capital accumulation function. The average human capital stock in the economy is given by H t = R h t z t fz t dz t = H 1, t,1 e t 2 where is the unconditional mean of z t . The absence of uncertainty at the aggregate level implies that prices, real wage pere ciency unit w t , and interest rate r t , are deterministic.
We assume that the government provides an unemployment bene t t . Agents with labor revenues below these bene ts will choose to join the social protection program. The others, whose investment in education results in relatively higher returns, will prefer to work, earning a labor income which hence still depends on the ability shock they were hit by. In their second life's period all individuals will repay their debt 1+r t e t , consume a part c t of their income, -labor earnings or unemployment bene t-, and save the remaining part s t in order to consume d t+1 = 1 + r t s t in their third life-period, when they retire.
Individual preferences are represented by a discounted sum of instantaneous utilities, each of them being CES, with 0 the inverse of elasticity of substitution. Future utility is discounted at a constant exogenous rate 2 0; 1. The problem consists in two steps and is solved backward. For a given investment e t and ability shock z t , the agent chooses s t in order to maximize his utility Uc t ; d t+1 = c t 1, 1 ,
1 , subject to his budget constraint. By that time the ability shock is revealed, so that h t is known, and the agents do not face any uncertainty anymore. We further assume the unemployment bene ts to be nanced by a proportional tax levied on the net revenues of both the employed and unemployed individuals. By net revenues we mean after deduction of the educational cost 1 + r t e t . Taxes are thus non distortional and any e ect on educational spending will be exclusively due to the presence of the unemployment bene t. The individually relevant budget constraint depends on the realization of the ability shock z t . For those who prefer to work, the budget constraint is ,1 the propensity to save.
In his rst life-period, the agent c hooses his educational e ort in real terms e t in order to maximize his expected indirect utility subject to his individual human capital accumulation rule 1. He faces uncertainty as he does not know ex ante what will bethe returns to his investment in education -z t is unknown ex ante-. When maximizing his indirect utility with respect to his educational e ort, the agent takes into account the fact that his choice of e t will a ect his probability of earning a wage smaller than the unemployment bene t. In particular this probability is given by This probability is indeed clearly determined by the value of the threshold t =H 1, t,1 e t w t e t , which depends on the individual level of educational investment e t . If we w ant unemployment bene ts to have some e ect on the individual's education decision, without however annihilating the incentive to carry out educational investment, t should be xed such that, given the level of educational spending e t the individual has chosen, we have that a e t b ; 4 Indeed, if t aH 1, a t e t w t , unemployment bene ts are too low t o h a ve any e ect on the individual's decision concerning his e ort. The problem reduces to the one without any unemployment bene t treated in Rillaers and Dur an 1998. When on the other hand t bH 1, t e t w t , t is so high that the individual has no incentive a n ymore to invest in education. In that case the only optimal e ort is the corner solution e t = 0 .
Another condition on t which needs to be ful lled in order to avoid corner solutions, is 5 states that the expected indirect utility derived from making an apparently optimal e ort should be superior to the utility derived from ex ante choosing the unemployment bene t without making any educational investment, and hence without contracting debts. If it is not, it is clear that the optimal decision will again be the one of zero investment.
Optimal educational investment will bethe solution of the expected indirect utility maximization problem, which is equivalent This expression will be referred to as the borrowing limit of the agent. The introduction of an unemployment bene t satisfying 4 may relax this borrowing limit, allowing for higher levels of indebtedness; this occurs when 1 + r t H t,1 aw t 1 + r t 1 1, ; 8 in which case the relevant, relaxed, borrowing limit is given by e t t 1 + r t : 9
Proposition 1 For any level of the unemployment bene t t satisfying 4
and 5, given a wage w t 0 and an interest rate r t ,1, we have that a when the unemployment bene t relaxes the borrowing limit, the optimal choice of educational investment e t is unique and interior for any value 2 0; 1 , in the sense that 9 holds with strict inequality.
b when the unemployment bene t does not relax the borrowing limit, and for 1, the optimal choice of educational investment e t is unique and interior in the sense that 7 holds with strict inequality.
See appendix A for a proof. We have that the individual will invest in his education up to the point where the expected return of the last unit of educational investment is equal to its marginal cost. From 10 we can however not unambiguously deduce what will be the e ect of an unemployment bene t on individual educational investment. We will therefore, in the next subsection, develop some numerical exercises.
The e ect of unemployment bene ts on individual investment
In order to examine the e ect of unemployment bene ts on individual educational investment, we carry out some numerical exercises in a partial equilibrium framework, in the sense that we examine the impact of unemployment bene ts on investment at given prices. We adopt the following settings for the parameters: we assume zero population growth: n = 0 ; the share of capital in total income is xed to 0.3; the relative weight of individual e ort in the human capital accumulation rule is set to 0:1; the psychological discount rate , is xed to 1.5. We further set = 3, which gives us accumulated growth rates between 1:7 and 2; this implies annual growth rates between 1.7 and 2.3, given the fact that each generation is assumed to live for 30 years. Capital per e ciency unit K t =L t is set to 0:032 in order to obtain an average of 4 for the annual interest rate. We set , the degree of risk aversion, equal to 3, as this gives us the richest results 3 .
We consider three levels of uncertainty, = 1 = p 3, = 1 :3 and = 1 :4, and we let t vary between 0 and its value for which optimal investment reduces to zero because of the no-veri cation of condition 5.
Two opposite e ects of unemployment bene ts on educational investment can be distinguished. On the one hand, by guaranteeing a minimum income independent of individual educational spending and of the resulting productivity, an unemployment bene t is likely to have a discouraging e ect. Agents have an incentive to spend less on education, since by doing so they will be less indebted, and hence they will have to pay back less in the next period. On the other hand, t may relax the borrowing limit 7, allowing for higher levels of educational investment. Indeed, when the borrowing limit prevents the upper bound of potential returns to education b to have the same weight as the lower bound a in the decision on investment, due to the fact that e ort is downward restricted by this limit, relaxing it will adjust the relative weights of both bounds in favor of the upper one; stated di erently, when the introduction of an unemployment bene t relaxes the borrowing limit, the range of admissible levels of investment will be extended upwardly. This allows the high productivity, potentially resulting from educational investment, to gain weight in the decision, compensating to a greater extent for the possibility of low productivity, and so inducing the individual to invest more. However, whereas the discouraging e ect is always observed, the introduction of an unemployment bene t does not always relax the borrowing limit. Indeed, the borrowing limit relaxing e ect will only take place if 8 holds. At given prices, the condition is likely to be ful lled for su ciently high levels of the bene t and or when a is small, or which is equivalent, for relatively high values of , the degree of uncertainty since a = m , p 3 .
Stated di erently, the borrowing limit relaxing e ect of t is likely to exist when the borrowing limit is severe this is when the di erence b ,a is huge, implying an important asymmetry between the relative weight of the two bounds in the decision. These di erent e ects are clearly observed in gure 1. When uncertainty is small, as is the case in graph a, the introduction of a su ciently attractive unemployment bene t, -this is when the left inequality of condition 4 is veri ed-, does not relax the borrowing constraint; indeed, in this case condition 8 cannot be met, since the level of t required would violate condition 5, implying zero optimal e ort. So there is only the discouraging e ect playing a role, inducing lower levels of investment as t increases. Graphs b and c show the case of higher degrees of uncertainty; although the introduction of a su ciently high unemployment bene t here too initially induces a smaller investment, this negative e ect converts into a positive one as t further increases, allowing condition 8 to be met. The borrowing limit relaxing e ect takes thus place, and becomes dominating for certain values of t , resulting in an increasing investment, which, according to graph c may even become superior to the one carried out in absence of any unemployment bene t. However, from a certain level of t on, the discouraging e ect becomes the dominating one again, inducing lower levels of investment, which nally fall to zero when condition 5 is no longer met. Hence we can conclude that whether the introduction of unemployment bene ts has a positive or negative e ect on educational investment, depends on whether these bene ts relax the borrowing limit and to what extent. This relaxing e ect only exists when uncertainty is high. Often the discouraging e ect is however either the only e ect, or at least the dominating one, inciting the individual to reduce his investment. In the following subsections we will take a closer look to the competitive equilibrium and the dynamics of the model, and we will examine the e ect of unemployment bene ts in the general equilibrium.
General equilibrium
It is convenient to rede ne the unemployment bene ts t provided by the government as a fraction of what would bethe average labor income in this economy but without unemployment. So, we de ne the replacement ratio as where , a=b , a is the fraction of the population which will prefer to join the social protection system. This fraction hence constitutes the unemployment rate in the economy, which we denote as t . Unemployment bene ts are assumed to be nanced by a proportional tax on all income; in order to have the budget balanced the tax revenues should equalize the total amount of unemployment bene ts. So we have that t " t t , 1 + r t e t + Z b z t H 1, t,1 e t w t , 1 + r t e t fz t dz t = t t 13 The supply side of the economy is represented by an aggregate neoclassical production function: a single representative rm endowed with a CobbDouglas technology, behaving competitively and hiring labor and capital. As there is no aggregate uncertainty the rm's problem is essentially deterministic. The rm will choose in every period some capital stock and some e ective labor so as to verify the usual rst order conditions which equalizes the marginal productivity o f e a c h production factor to its price.
Equilibrium in the labor market will be more subtle as not the total population will be employed. At period t only a proportion 1 , t of the total population N t,1 works, the remaining t N t,1 individuals are unemployed. The demand for credit consists of the rm's gross investment K t+1 and of the current young generation's investment in human capital N t e t+1 . The clearing of the capital market implies that aggregate savings, -the supply of credit-, should equal investment in physical and human capital. Thus N t,1 S t = K t+1 + N t e t+1 : 17
The goods markets will clear as soon as the credit and labor markets do so and the individual budget constraint holds.
De nition 1 Given an initial capital stock K 0 , an initial stock of human capital H ,1 , and an initial population N t,2 , an intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence fe t , K t , L t , h t , H t , s t , S t , t , t g and a sequence of prices f1 + r t , w t g, which for all t 0 satisfy 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, and the three market equilibrium conditions: 17, L t = N t,1 H t and the clearing of the goods market.
Dynamics
The law of motion of average human capital gives us the growth g t of human capital H t H t,1 = 1 + g t = H , t,1 e t : 18
A balanced growth path is de ned as a sequence of competitive equilibria along which average human capital grows at a constant rate g 0. The other average variables will also grow at this rate g, while the aggregate ones grow at a rate n+g. In order to have v ariables which remain stationary along the balanced growth path, we will carry out the following transformation. Let e t = e t =H t,1 , while savings pere ciency unit are de ned asŝ t = s t =H t so thatŜ t = ,a b,aŝ t + R b ŝ tzt fz t dz t . Capital stock per e ciency unit does already remain constant along a balanced growth path.
Due to the complicated nature of the system we do not provide a proof for the existence, uniqueness, and global stability of the steady state. Numerical exercises seem to indicate however, that at least for some reasonable values of the parameters, the steady state exists, is unique and at least locally stable. In the next section we rely on numerical methods in order to study the e ect of unemployment bene ts on the steady state educational investmentê.
The e ect of unemployment bene ts on steady state educational investment
In this numerical example we adopt the same settings for the parameters as before: n = 0; = 0:3; = 1:5; = 3, = 0:1 and = 3, which gives us values for the annual interest rate uctuating around 5. We consider the three cases studied previously in the partial equilibrium: = 1 = p 3, = 1 :3 and = 1 :4. We let the replacement ratio vary from 0 up to a value which in the general equilibrium appears to violate condition 5, leading to an optimal e ort equal to 0. For the three cases considered this upper value for is respectively 1:2, 1:5, and 1:6. We examine the e ect of the replacement ratio on investment in the steady state. We also compute the corresponding unemployment and tax rates.
From gure 2 we observe the same patterns as in the partial equilibrium analysis: the general trend consists in a decrease of educational spending whenever unemployment bene ts are introduced such as to be su ciently attractive to induce unemployment. This is due to the fact that the agent receives these unemployment bene ts independently of whether he invests or not in education, which induces him to decrease his educational e ort, as e ort is costly anyway. Here again, while for small values of this e ect is monotonously negative, for higher values of , e ort may beincreasing for certain values of . This is because of the borrowing limit relaxing e ect, which unemployment bene ts are likely to have when uncertainty is high, and which may overcompensate the discouraging e ect. When reaches a certain value, the discouraging e ect becomes the dominating one, depressing optimal e ort again, until the latter falls to zero.
Hence, only for high degrees of uncertainty m a y h a ve a positive e ect, even leading to an optimal level of investment superior to the one which would be optimal if there were no unemployment bene ts. In part c of gure 2 we observe that this is the case for = 0 :7. Notwithstanding the higher growth rate this larger e ort implies on the aggregate level, one may not loose sight of the corresponding unemployment and tax rate, which in this case are quite high: 31 and 21 respectively; nor of the subsequent w elfare loss for at least part of the population, due to the taxes and the drop in production resulting from the reduced size of the active labor force.
In the next section we will have a look at the implications of unemployment bene ts in terms of wage inequality, unemployment and welfare. In this section we develop a numerical example of our model in order to approximate the economies of Western Europe and of the United States in terms of economic performance. In particular, we reproduce some stylized facts that characterize these two economies and underline their contrasting performance in terms of some macroeconomic indicators. The parameters in the two constructed hypothetical economies only di er in respectively the presence and the absence of unemployment bene ts. We assume that both economies are hit by a common skill-biased technological shock which increases the productivity of the highly skilled workers. We rely on previous work by Marim om and Zilibotti 1997 according to which such a skilledbiased technological change can generate quite di erent responses in both economies, due to one institutional di erence, namely the degree of social protection.
Europe vs. United States: some stylized facts
Europe and the United States are characterized by a contrasting performance of their economies, but both countries also display similarities. A rst manifest di erence between the two economies concerns unemployment. Indeed, unemployment has increased dramatically in Western Europe, from an average rate of 4 during the period 1971-1980 to an average of 9 during the period 1981-1990. Today it approaches 11 see European Commission 1997, page 197. In the United States however, unemployment has been maintained during the last thirty y ears at a rough average rate of 6. Growth rates, on the contrary, h a ve been quite similar in both economies during the last 25 years, though slightly higher in the United States about 2.5 a year compared to Europe about 2.3 a year. Di erent employment rates and similar growth rates necessarily imply di erences in productivity growth. If we compare the annual percentage change in the gross domestic product per employed, we indeed observe di erences between the two economies, in favour of the European one. The average gap between the percentage change of labor productivity in the European Union and the United States has been above 1 per year for the period 1973-1992: the average annual growth rate of labor productivity in Europe has been 2.2, compared to 1.1 in the United states Maddison 1995, p.81. Although Europe has also achieved considerable progress as far as ed-ucation is concerned, the American labor force is still characterized by a higher instruction level: the percentages of adult population having achieved secondary school, non university superior education and university are respectively 41, 15 and 15, compared to averages of 35, 7 and 8 for Europe OCDE 1993, p.86. This advantage in education level is however accompanied by an increasing wage inequality, which is partially the result of the augmenting gap between the earnings of the quali ed and the non-quali ed; whereas university graduates enjoyed a sustained growth of their real income during the last decade, the low skilled faced a decrease in their real earnings. As a result the gap between the earnings of the high and low skilled has increased from 15 to 50 OCDE 1993. In Europe, social inequalities are more limited, despite the higher unemployment rate Marim om and Zilibotti 1997.
In the next subsection we aim to reproduce the above stylized facts by developing a numerical example of our model, and by introducing a skillbiased technological shock.
A numerical example of the model and the skillbiased technological shock
We construct two di erent h ypothetical economies E1 and E2 by developing a numerical example of the model. The only di erence between both economies concerns the extent of social insurance. More particularly, one economy, denoted as E1, will be characterized by the absence of unemployment bene ts, implying a replacement ratio = 0. Whereas the other economy, denoted by E2, is assumed to provide unemployment bene ts, and is hence characterized by a strictly positive replacement ratio . E1 can beconsidered as an approach to a US-type laissez-faire economy, while E2 rather stands for the European welfare society. The unemployment bene ts are assumed to be nanced by proportional, non distortional taxes levied on the income of both employed and unemployed individuals. The two economies are identical as far as all other parameters are concerned.
We k eep the same settings as before for and . We c hoose and such as to obtain a steady state value for the interest rate over the whole period of 5:18, and an annual growth rate of 2; this gives = 0 :1 and = 3 . For simplicity's sake w e still assume a uniform earnings distribution, although we are aware of the fact that this does not correspond to reality 4 . is set to 1= p 3, which gives an earnings dispersion characterized by a ratio highest wage to lowest wage equal to 2. Although this might seem underestimated at rst sight, it can beconsidered as a reasonable characterization for the earnings dispersion taking into account that we assume a uniform distribution 5 . The replacement ratio is set to 0:66, implying that the unemployment bene ts t amount to 66 of what would bethe average labor income in this economy but without unemployment. Since for = 0:66, a, this amount t will initially not be su ciently high in order to induce unemployment. Like in Marim om and Zilibotti 1997 we assume that both economies are initially at their steady states, which w e i n terpret as the situation of the early 70's. As the unemployment bene ts in E2 are not su ciently attractive, and hence do not induce any unemployment, the steady state is initially identical for both economies; it is characterized by the second column of table 1.
We now introduce a skill-biased technological shock which hits both economies to the same extent, and which the individuals perfectly anticipate. This shock is assumed to summarize a process of rapid technological change, biased in favor of the skilled workers. Such a shock w ould have taken place in the 1980's, inducing a sharp rise in skill di erentials See Berman, Pound and Griliches 1994. According to Krueger 1993 , the proliferation of computers at work has been the main responsible for this process, causing substantial changes in the relative productivity of various types of workers; in particularly it increased the productivity of the already highly productive workers. In our model we assume this phenomenon to be translated into an increase of the productivity of the relatively more highly productive w orkers, while leaving unchanged the productivity of the less productive ones. This is achieved by increasing the upper bound b = + p 3 of the support of the distribution of the productivity shock z t , maintaining the lower bound a = , p 3 unchanged. This implies that the mean and the standard deviation will increase. In particular we assume here that increases from its initial value 3 up to 3:6, and up to 1:6 p 3 , verifying that a remains equal a thin upper tail. 5 With the above c haracterization we obtain the following values for the ratios between deciles of the earnings distribution: D9=D5 = 1:27, D1=D5 = 0:67 and D9=D1 = 1:7. When comparing with real data this seems underestimated: in 1975 we observe for the US: D9=D5 = 1:93, D1=D5 = 0:41 and D9=D1 = 4:71; for Germany: D9=D5 = 1:50, D1=D5 = 0 :75 and D9=D1 = 2 :00; and for the UK: D9=D5 = 1 :66, D1=D5 = 0 :70 and D9=D1 = 2 :37 See Nickell and Bell, 1996, p. 310 . It should be taken into account h o wever, that a uniform distribution as assumed in this paper, does not account for the upper and lower tails of the density function characterizing the earnings distribution. These tails re ect the existence of extreme upper and lower observations, which are determinant for the deciles D1 and D9 notwithstanding their small density. to 2. Table 1 summarizes the results. Thirty years after the shock, at t = 1, we observe that, whereas in E1 unemployment is still inexistent, E2 now faces an unemployment rate of 11:75. As a consequence of the shock a verage productivity , and hence has increased, and has become superior to a. For the individuals with a productivity up to z = , it is now more attractive to get unemployed and receive the unemployment bene t , than to keep on working. The nancing of these unemployment bene ts requires the levying of a tax rate of 8.22 on net income.
Results
The technological shock increases the average productivity per e ectively employed unit of e ciency labor in both economies, but this increase will be more accentuated in E2 compared to E1. This is obviously due to the fact that in E2 the active labor force does not include the less productive part of the population.
The growth rate increases as a consequence of the technological shock, and the extent to which it does is approximately the same in both economies. The increase of average productivity due to the shock, accounts for this increase of the growth rate, and this notwithstanding the diminishing educational e ort pere ciency unit. However, if we take a look at what happens in the long run, this is at the new steady state, we observe that the growth rate in both economies slightly decreases again. This is due to the persistent decrease in educational e ort per e ciency unit, which also accounts for the decrease in the average productivity i n t h e long run.
Investment per e ciency unitê in both economies indeed decreases in t = 1, and continues to do so up to when the new steady state is reached. On the one hand this is a direct consequence of the substitution e ect induced by a higher expected average productivity of education 6 . On the other one, the higher quantity o f a vailable units of e ciency labor leads to a lower real wage per e ciency unit and a higher interest rate implying decreasing returns to and increasing costs of educational investment. The more important decrease in the level of investment observed in the economy with unemployment bene ts compared to the one without, is due to the presence of such bene ts. As they do not relax the borrowing limit ^ =1+r aw=1+r 1 1, , they have an exclusively discouraging e ect on educational investment through 6 We did some numerical exercises in order to analyze the e ect of an increase of on educational investment, and observed that this e ect is always negative. the guaranteeing of an unconditional minimum income 7 . As a consequence of the shock, income inequality has sharpened considerably in both economies, although to a larger extent in E1 compared to E2: the ratio between lowest and highest income has decreased, as did the ratio of the income share earned by the bottom quintile and the top quintile of the income distribution; the Atkinson index 8 has increased, again indicating higher inequality. Although the technological shock has an overall inequality increasing e ect, in E2 this is partially o set by the existence of unemployment bene ts. In E1 however, as no insurance exists, the wider productivity gap is entirely translated into an increasing income inequality. The less productive part of the population is clearly better o with than without unemployment bene ts, while more highly productive w orkers would prefer a no insurance system, in order to avoid paying taxes. Figure 3 represents the utility corresponding to the di erent levels of productivity in both economies, for the rst and the fourth period subsequent to the shock 9 . From these graphs we can indeed deduce that, while highly productive w orkers loose in utility terms because of the taxes they pay, the part of the population with the lowest productivity, bene ts from utility gains from the provision of unemployment bene ts. This part however, only represents a small share of total population which would imply a rather scarce political support for introducing unemployment bene ts. Note also that the gap between the two curves becomes wider in relative terms through time, due to the higher growth rate in E1 compared to E2. A consequence will bethat political support for unemployment bene ts will diminish over time, as an ever decreasing part of the population would bene t from it in terms of utility. Indeed, while in the rst period after the shock this part represents 8 of the population, it decreases to 6:8 in the fourth period.
Y , where Y i denotes the income of those in the ith income range; f i denotes the proportion of the population with incomes in the ith range; and Y denotes the mean income. Atkinson 1983 9 A w elfare analysis at the steady state is impossible to be carried out as utility continuously grows at the steady state. Therefore we compare utility levels at certain points in time, and not at the steady state.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined whether unemployment bene ts can induce the individual to invest more in his education when the returns to this investment are characterized by uncertainty. This analysis is carried out in an overlapping generations model in which human capital investment through educational e ort accounts for endogenous growth. We nd that the introduction of unemployment bene ts generates two opposite e ects on individual educational investment. On the one hand, unemployment bene ts, by guaranteeing a minimum income independently of individual investment and productivity, induce lower levels of e ort. On the other hand, these bene ts may relax the borrowing limit, allowing for higher levels of borrowing. This second, investment encouraging e ect only exists provided the introduction of unemployment bene ts actually does relax the borrowing limit, which is only the case for rather high degrees of uncertainty.
Whether the introduction of an unemployment bene t nally induces higher levels of educational investment depends thus on whether these bene ts relax the borrowing limit and to what extent. However, often the discouraging e ect is either the only e ect, or at least the dominating one, inciting the individual to reduce his investment. Even in the case in which unemployment bene ts do relax the borrowing limit, the ultimate e ect on investment is very sensitive to the amount o f t h e bene t, which makes it an instrument quite awkward to handle.
According to these results, unemployment bene ts are thus not necessarily growth enhancing. Accompanying them with subsidies to education may be a way to cancel this pervert, investment reducing e ect, preserving its other, more desirable consequences, like the reduction of income inequality. Indeed, when developing a numerical example of the model for two h ypothetical economies which only di er in the presence and absence of unemployment bene ts, we nd that in the economy with unemployment bene ts, the wage inequality is smaller than in the one without. In particular we observe that the agents with a low productivity are better o in terms of utility in an economy with unemployment bene ts. We verify that the introduction of unemployment bene ts helps the model to re ect some di erences European data display with respect to North American data; in particular, the unemployment bene ts seem to provide a possible explanation for the di erences between both economies in terms of unemployment rate, labor productivity, education level and wage inequality.
Due to the taxes however, a vast majority of agents is worse o in an economy with unemployment bene ts; political support in favor of an insur-ance system will thus be rather scarce. An extension of the present paper, in analogy with Glomm and Ravikumar 1992 and Alesina and Rodrik 1995, may hence bethe study of the conditions necessary to lead to majority v oting in favor of the introduction of unemployment bene ts, and hence of more income equality.
J 0 e t 0
After integrating 20 for respectively 2 0; 1 nf1g and for = 1, and after rearranging terms, it is straightforward to see that J 0 e t = ,1. 
